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Introduction
JUDICIAL PANEL SELECTION IN THE UK SUPREME
COURT: BIGGER BENCH, MORE AUTHORITY?
Dr Daniel Clarry*
Christopher Sargeant †
1 Introduction
Now in its seventh year of publication, this latest volumeof theUKSupreme
Court Yearbook (`the Yearbook') reviews the jurisprudence of the UK
Supreme Court (`the Court') in the 2015-16 legal year. As in previous
years, the Court's caseload during this time has been broad and highly varied
and significant discussion of many of the issues raised before it during the
past twelve months can be found in the pages that follow. One interesting
institutional aspect of the Court that continues to emerge in the disposition
of its caseload is the determination of the size of the panel thatwill constitute
the Court for the authoritative disposition of its caseload and the selection
of Justices to comprise any such panels.
On 8 November 2016, the Court announced that it had granted permission
to appeal in R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union (`Miller '),1 a case now popularly known (even by the Court)
as `the Article 50 case' or `the Brexit case' in which the Court will determine
an appeal by the Government from the Divisional Court that notice under
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty of the UK's intention to leave the European
Union cannot be given by the PrimeMinister without the agreement of the
UK Parliament.2
On any view, the Article 50 case raises a series of fascinating substantive
questions, many of which will be considered in detail in our next volume.
* Editor-in-Chief, The UK Supreme Court Yearbook; Fellow in Law, London School of
Economics; Fellow in Private Law and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School.
† Editor-in-Chief, The UK Supreme Court Yearbook; Teaching Associate, School of Law,
University of Nottingham; PhD Candidate, University of Cambridge.
1 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC
2768 (Admin).
2 See UK Supreme Court, `Permission to Appeal: Article 50 (`Brexit') Case' (UK Supreme
Court, 8 November 2016) <www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-decision-
08-november-2016.htm> accessed 20 November 2016.
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In this volume, Lord Millett offers readers a preview of that important case
by analysing what he believes is the `real question' in the appeal, which will
be heard by the Court on 5-8 December 2016.3 This Introduction focuses,
at least initially, on the decision of the Court to hear the appeal inMiller en
banc before all 11 of its current full-time Justices, the first time that it has
chosen to take such a step. The Court is somewhat unusual in the common
law world in not sitting en banc as a matter of course; as observed earlier,
Miller will be the first occasion in which the Court will do so in what will
be eight years of its operation.4 The Court is also unusual in the selection
of Justices to comprise its panels in that it occasionally invites persons who
are not full-time Justices of the Court, including retired Justices, to sit on
panels as an ad hoc Justice to constitute the Court in the disposition of its
caseload.5
As a result of these anomalies and the increased attention paid by the
Court to the importance of its panel sizes , this Introduction considers the
procedures which govern the process of panel selection in the UK Supreme
Court before then going on to formally introduce the specific contents
contained within this volume. Two key questions frame our analysis and
observations: first, how is it (ordinarily) decided which of the Justices will
sit on a given case; and second, how is it decided in what size panel this will
be?
2 Which Justices Sit onWhich Cases?
There is presently minimal information in the public domain concerning
how it is decided which Justices will sit on a case before the Court. No
reference to this issue is, for example, to be found on the Court's website or
in its rules of procedure, nor was such guidance (at least publicly) available
3 Lord Millett, `Prerogative Power and Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty' (2016) 7 The UK
Supreme Court Yearbook [x].
4 The SupremeCourts of Canada (9 Justices), NewZealand (5 Justices) and theUS (9 Justices),
usually sit en banc to decide cases, although the US Supreme Court has sat for most of the
present calendar year with only 8 Justices following the death of Justice Scalia on 12/13
February 2016 and in the absence of a new appointment to fill that vacancy. Like the
UK Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia routinely sits in panels comprising a
selection of its Justices, rather than en banc ; however, all of its Justices will sit together
to decide cases of considerable, typically constitutional, importance. See High Court of
Australia, `Operation of the High Court' <www.hcourt.gov.au/about/operation> accessed
20 November 2016 (`Cases which involve interpretation of the Constitution, or where the
Court may be invited to depart from one of its previous decisions, or where the Court
considers the principle of law involved to be one of major public importance, are normally
determined by a full bench comprising all seven Justices if they are available to sit.').
5 For the list of ad hoc Justices of the UK Supreme Court for the past legal year, see
`Composition of the Court' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook [x].
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when the Court previously sat as the Appellate Committee of the House
of Lords (`the Appellate Committee'). Indeed, even some of the former
Law Lords of the Appellate Committee appear to have been unsure of how
exactly the judicial panel selection process worked. As Professor Penny
Darbyshire discovered in her penetrating research on this issue published in
2011 for example, `it was clear in 2005 and 2008 that the Law Lords did not
fully understand the selection criteria. ``We just say when we're available.'''6
Nonetheless, some overarching selection conventions are evident from the
general practice of the Court, including: that at least one of the Scottish
Justices will sit on appeals from Scotland; that the Northern Irish Justice
will sit on appeals from Northern Ireland;7 that Justices do not sit on cases
which they heard when in the Court of Appeal; and that Justices do not sit
on panels hearing appeals from cases previously decided by a close family
member – e.g. Lord Mance does not sit on cases heard by his wife, Lady
JusticeArden. Itwould also seem to be the case that Justiceswith specialisms
in certain fields of law will sit on panels raising issues in those fields and
that they may often subsequently take a lead role in writing the relevant
judgment in such cases.8 Even observing those apparent conventions from
the general practice of the Court however, their day-to-day application
remains somewhat of a mystery, even to those persons who are otherwise
well-versed in the Court's internal operational workings.
In his masterful scholarly contribution, Final Judgment: The Last Law
Lords and the Supreme Court, however,9 Professor Alan Paterson traces the
development of the processes concerning the selection process for judicial
panels in the Appellate Committee from the 1970s and, in particular, from
the time of the arrival of Lord Bingham as the senior Law Lord in 2000. By
this time, Professor Paterson notes that:
The composition of the Appellate Committees was, in prac-
tice, largely in the hands of the Principal Clerk to the Judicial
Office, who oversaw the drawing up of the proposed panels
6 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judge (Hart 2011) 369.
7 There is also a developing convention that a Welsh Judge will sit in cases originating from
Wales. Given the present lack of aWelsh Justice on the Court this is currently usually Lord
Thomas CJ.
8 See e.g. Jonathan Crow QC, Lara Hassell and Emma Horner, `Commercial Law and
Financial Regulation' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook x, y (observing the
prominent roles played by LordMance, Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption in the commercial
law cases and noting their commercial law backgrounds); Guy Fetherstonhaugh QC, `Land,
Housing and Tenancy Law' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook x, x (observing the
roles played by Lord Neuberger and Lord Carnwath in the land, housing and tenancy law
cases and noting their property-related backgrounds).
9 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 2013).
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[…] Although, by Convention, the final say lay with the two
most senior Law Lords [but] in practice neither of them made
many changes […] [E]specially in nine-judge cases [however],
Lord Bingham took the view that the Committee should con-
sist of the more senior Law Lords […] in the case of a nor-
mal five-Judge panel, the Clerk took account of a number of
factors including availability, conflicts of interest, workload,
who had sat on the Appeal Committee and the needs of Privy
Council […] Themost significant factor was specialisation and
here […] the Clerk […] worked with his notion of `A' teams.
[T]owards the end of the [Appellate Committee however] it
was not unknown for some Law Lords, but by no means all,
to ask if they could sit on that appeal [but] such requests were
not the norm.10
In addressing whether anything has changed since the transition from the
Appellate Committee to the Court, Professor Paterson continues:
Notmuch appears to be the answer. The panels to hear appeals
are largely selected by the Registrar, in practice, using the
same criteria as in the last years of the [Appellate Committee].
There have [however] been two small changes from the
House. […] [First], heeding the protests of the more junior
Justices, [the President] no longer [chooses] the composition
of the larger Courts mainly on seniority. Secondly, it was
agreed by the Justices that they would not ask the Registrar
to consider their names for selection when interesting cases
were coming up. Nonetheless it appears that some do ask
and are occasionally successful and that those appointed after
2009 have not been told of the `ruling' […] In short, in the
Supreme Court as in the [Appellate Committee] under Lord
Bingham, the senior Justices have the most say in which
appeals are admitted and in whether they get to participate in
the hearing.11
Notwithstanding these undoubtedly perceptive insights, the processes
behind the determination of panel size and composition of theCourt remain
little understood, in particular by thewider public. Onemight of course ask,
why does thismatter? It clearly cannot be said that the outcome of a case can
10 ibid 71.
11 ibid 72–73.
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be pre-determined simply by looking at the identity of the specific Justices
responsible for hearing it.12 As Professor Brice Dickson has noted in this
regard:
The judges are […] very much constrained by the specific
facts of the appeals in question, and sometimes by concessions
which have been made by the parties' lawyers. In addition,
judges can be persuaded to change their initial opinion on a
case by the force of the arguments put to them by barristers
representing the opposing point of view, or the view of an
intervener. As Alan Paterson has so ably demonstrated, judges
may also change one another'sminds during their post-hearing
deliberations.13
Despite this, the cases which come before the Court are often capable of
being decided in a number of different ways, each of which will represent
an entirely plausible solution to the matter at hand. Likewise, such cases
may require the Justices to pass judgment on themerits of competing claims
concerning matters of public policy and/or the lawfulness of controversial
State actions. Legitimatemindsmaywell (and frequently do) differ over the
reasoning and result of themany complex cases before the Court. Nicklinson
remains a sombre example in which a panel of nine Justices of the Court
diverged considerably on whether the Court had the power to declare that
the statutory law prohibiting assisted suicide was incompatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights (`ECHR') and, if so, whether it
ought to do so.14 One cannot help but wonder whether the substitution of
one of the Justices in a narrow majority in such a controversial case with
another Justice not hearing the case, would have made a difference to the
result. As Professor Erika Rackley has observed, `once we accept that who
the judge is matters, then it matters who our judges are.'15
12 Baroness Hale, `Appointments to the UK Supreme Court' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court
Yearbook [x], [x].
13 Brice Dickson, `Activism and Restraint within the UK Supreme Court' (2015) 21(1)
European Journal of Current Legal Issues.
14 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 AC 657, [111]-[130]
(Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Mance and Lord Wilson agreed)), [230]-[235] (Lord
Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke, Lord Reed and Lord Hughes agreed)), [324]-[325]
(LadyHale (dissenting (withwhomLordKerr agreed)); cfCarter v Canada (Attorney-General)
[2015] SCC 5 (per curiam). See Daniel Clarry, `Judicial Law-Making and Parliamentary
Sovereignty in the UK Legal Order' (2014) 5 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook 1; Lord
Hodge, `Judicial Law-Making in a Changing Constitution' (2014) 5 The UK Supreme Court
Yearbook 58, 68; Lord Justice Elias, `Are Judges Becoming Too Political?' (2014) 5 The UK
Supreme Court Yearbook 109, 123-25.
15 Erika Rackley,Women, Judging and the Law (Routledge 2013) 164.
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For this reason, it not only matters who is appointed to become a Justice
of the Court, as recent efforts to enhance the diversity in judicial officers,
together with heightened attention paid to improving the selection process
generally evidence,16 but it also mattes, after appointment, which Justices
will be selected to determine which cases and how it is decided which of the
Justices will sit in any given case. This also correlates with the increasing
development of a body of academic evidence concerning the identification
of general trends amongst the different Justices in regards their openness
to engaging in acts of judicial law-making. As Professor Brice Dickson
explains in this volume:
[o]f the 12 Justices sitting in the Court (at the time of writing,
the membership is the same today as it was then), six could
be said to be relatively restrained in their approach to judicial
law-making (Lord Sumption, Lord Clarke, Lord Hughes, Lord
Toulson, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge), four others appeared
more willing to develop the law but still hesitated to do
so (Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Wilson and Lord
Carnwath), and only the two remaining Justices could be said
to be very supportive of judicial activism (Lord Kerr and Lady
Hale).17
Taken together, these points suggest that it may well be impossible to
conclusively say that a given casemay not `have been different if a differently
composed panel had sat'.18 Indeed, whether or not one personally accepts
this as a justified concern, it appears that many of the actors within the
Court itself are at least alive to it as a possibility. As Professor Darbyshire
thus explains, `this point remains so well-accepted [by the Court] that it
was even mentioned by a personal assistant (not a judicial assistant) to one
of the Justices while she was showing my students around the Court in
2014'.19 Furthermore, the notion that a bigger bench exudesmore authority
is supported by contemporary evidence of judicial panel selection in the
Court and, in particular, its decision to hear the appeal in Miller before all
of 11 its current full-time Justices (en banc as it were).20 Indeed, Lady Hale
16 See Baroness Hale (n 12).
17 Brice Dickson, `UK Supreme Court Justices and Human Rights in the 2015-16 Legal Year'
(2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook 199, 199; cf Nicklinson (n 14).
18 Paterson (n 9) 72.
19 Penny Darbyshire, `The UK Supreme Court – Is There Anything Left To Think About?'
(2015) 6 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook 148, 150.
20 Miller (n 1); UKSupremeCourt (n 2). Following LordToulson's retirement from theCourt
on 22 September 2016, the Court remains a (wo)man down from its full complement of 12
Justices. See `Composition of the Court' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook [x].
As to future appointments and judicial diversity, see Baroness Hale (n 12).
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observes in this volume that one of the reasons for larger panels constituting
the Court is `the greater authority it gives to a decision, the greater the
number of justices who agree upon it.'21 At the very least, this indicates
that the rules, which shape the selection process for determining the Court's
panels, should bemade generally available so as to provide additional clarity
as to how this process works in practice. This would enable greater public
scrutiny of the rules and would serve to ensure that judicial transparency is
enhanced as a consequence.
3 What Size Panel Sits in Each Case?
The second issue considered herein concerns how the size of the panel in
which the Court is to sit in each case is determined. In light of the discussion
above, it might be thought desirable for the Court to always (or at least
more frequently) sit en banc and thus to mirror the practice of other final
appellate Courts including the US Supreme Court. Indeed, this proposal
was suggested as long ago as 1972 by Louis Blom-Cooper QC, Professor
Brice Dickson and Professor Gavin Drewry and also appears to be favoured
by at least some of the Justices themselves.22 As one member of the Court
thus explained in an interviewwith ProfessorDarbyshire published in 2011,
`[i]n a perfect world, [...] wewould probably reduce the whole court to nine
and then always sit as the whole court.'23 Despite this, the Court routinely
sits in a `basic' panel of 5 Justices and only convenes larger panels of 7 or
9 (or 11 as in Miller) when it considers this necessary on a case-by-case
basis. Conversely, the Court shrinks its panel size to say, three Justices, in
relatively straightforward matters in which it is not being asked to decide
major questions of law, but rather a question that is of importance to the
parties alone (e.g. applications for permission to appeal to the Court).24
The decision as to panel size is made initially by the Registrar, albeit this
is again subject to final approval from both the President and Deputy
President of the Court.25 In making this decision, a set of guidelines are
21 Baroness Hale (n 12) [x].
22 See Louis Blom Cooper, Brice Dickson and Gavin Drewry (eds), The Judicial House of Lords
(OUP 2009) 153.
23 Darbyshire (n 19) 169.
24 But see BPE Solicitors v Gabriel [2015] UKSC 39, [2015] 1 AC 1663 (in which an application
for directions as to the costs of a pending appeal was heard by a panel of five Justices); BNY
Mellon Corporate Trustee v LBG Capital No 1 [2016] UKSC 29, [2016] Bus LR 725 (in which
a panel of five Justices heard an appeal raising `no questions of wider legal significance'),
see especially [49] (Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke agreed)) (`This case is of
considerable financial importance to the parties but raises no questions of wider legal
significance. There is therefore no point in dissenting at any length.'). SeeCrowQC,Hassell
and Horner (n 8) x.
25 Paterson (n 9) 72–73.
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used which, since 2010, have been available on the Court's website.26 The
guidelines provide that the Court will be more likely to sit in larger Panels
if:
(a) The Court is being asked to depart, or may decide to depart from a
previous decision.
(b) A case is considered to be of high constitutional importance.
(c) A case is considered to be of great public importance.
(d) A case where a conflict between decisions in the House of Lords,
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and/or the Supreme Court
has to be reconciled.
(e) A case raises an important point in relation to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.27
The reasons behind these criteria appear to be two-fold. First, it appears
that it is felt by the Court to be desirable for its most complex, important
and controversial cases to receive consideration from a greater number of
Justices so as to ensure that the legal issues raised therein are fully probed
and tested in Court and during deliberations among the Justices afterwards
(curia advisari vult). Thus, in Patel v Mirza,28 it is understandable that the
Court would want to convene a panel of nine of its Justices in an attempt
to settle the law of illegality, which has vexed the Court in recent years.29
Unfortunately, however, a larger panel size may only serve to entrench the
division and instability in the law, if a larger plurality of Justices disagree
on the essential reasoning for the disposition of an appeal, as the Court
did in Patel v Mirza with a 5:4 split, even if concurring as to the outcome.
Whilst unanimity is to be welcomed in the disposition of appeals, latent
difficulties may emerge in the future application of the law if the waters
remainmuddied as to the flow of the common law in the essential reasoning
that is deployed to determine the outcome of such cases.
26 UK Supreme Court, `Panel Numbers Criteria' (UK Supreme Court 2010)
<www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-numbers-criteria.html> accessed 20 Novem-
ber 2016.
27 ibid.
28 [2016] UKSC 42, [2016] 3 WLR 399.
29 SeeHounga v Allen [2014]UKSC 47, [2014] 1WLR2889; Les Laboratories v Apotex Inc [2014]
UKSC 55, [2015] AC 430; Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liq) v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] 1 AC 1.
See also Graham Virgo, `Judicial Discretion in the UK Supreme Court' (2015) 6 The UK
Supreme Court Yearbook 233; James Goudkamp, `The Doctrine of Illegality: A Private
Law Hydra' (2015) 6 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook 254.
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Secondly, however, as Professor Darbyshire has explained, if `we accept
the argument that two separate groups of five judges may differ in their
treatment of any case, then it follows that they should sit in sevens or
nines as often as possible'.30 A fortiori the Court ought to be comprised of
the largest size possible in the most serious, controversial and/or complex
cases, so as to avoid speculation that the size or composition of the panel
constituting the Court had a bearing on the outcome of the case or that a
different panel of Justicesmay have decided the case in a different way or for
different reasons.31 Such considerations would seem to raise engineering
faults in the very design of the common law tradition or, perhaps worse,
concerns for the rule of law in a lack of transparency in the administration
of justice at the highest level of judicial decision-making.
In practice, however, it is not clear that these criteria are always applied
consistently. This is illustrated by contrasting the approach of the Court
in two of the most important and interesting cases which it decided during
the 2015-16 legal year, namely R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen (`Jogee and
Ruddock')32 andKeyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(`Keyu'),33 both of which are considered in detail in the articles which follow
later in this volume.34 In Jogee and Ruddock, for example, the Court sat as
a `basic' panel of 5 Justices, albeit this did include the President, the Deputy
President, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and two Justices
of the Court with extensive subject matter specialisms in the issue under
review.35 In its decision, however, the Court abolished an entire species
of criminal responsibility, namely `parasitic accessorial liability' (`PAL') and
overruled `30 years of jurisprudence, including a number of authorities from
high authority'36 such as Chan Win Siu v R37 and R v Powell, Daniels and
English.38 It did so without reference to the Practice Statement39 and by
30 Darbyshire (n 19) 151.
31 Baroness Hale (n 12) x (noting that one of the reasons for the increased usage of larger panel
sizes by the Court is `the (apparently) reduced risk that the composition of the panel will
dictate the result.').
32 [2016] UKSC 8, 2016] UKPC 7, [2016] 2 WLR 681. Ruddock v The Queen was an appeal
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from Jamaica, which was conjoined to the
appeal to the Court inR v Jogee such that the Court and the Privy Council sat simultaneously
in the disposition of both appeals.
33 [2015] UKSC 69, [2015] 3 WLR 1665.
34 See Julian B Knowles QC, `Joint Enterprise After Jogee and Ruddock: What Next?' (2016) 7
The UK Supreme Court Yearbook x; Thomas Poole and Sangeeta Shah, `A Very Successful
Action? Keyu and Historical Wrongs at Common Law' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court
Yearbook x.
35 Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Thomas, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson, respectively.
36 Knowles QC (n 34).
37 [1984] UKPC 27, [1985] AC 168.
38 [1997] UKHL 57, [1999] 1 AC 1.
39 See UK Supreme Court Practice Directions, 3.1.3 and 6.6.10, adopting the approach of the
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dismissing `a central plank of the prosecution's case that even if PAL was
flawed, it was a matter for Parliamentary reform and not a matter for the
courts'40 via a simple statement that:
As to the argument that even if the court is satisfied that the
law took a wrong turn, any correction should now be left to
Parliament, the doctrine of secondary liability is a common
law doctrine (put into statutory form in section 8 of the
[Accessories and Abettors Act 1861]) and, if it has been unduly
widened by the courts, it is proper for the courts to correct the
error.41
Furthermore, it appears that the impetus for such an outcome had in fact
come directly from the Court itself. As Julian Knowles QC, lead counsel for
Mr Ruddock in the case, has noted in this volume:
Leave to appeal was granted in both cases in earlyMarch 2015.
When the Appellants' solicitors received the Court's orders
granting leave they also received a letter indicating that there
was to be a joint hearing of both appeals by the Supreme Court
and the Privy Council. The letter said:
The second certified question in Jogee and the
grounds raise issues beyond the suggested distinc-
tion between foresight of possibility and foresight
of `real probability'. The Court will accordingly
wish to hear argument upon the foundations of
secondary liability for offences of violence and to
examine the cases from Hui Chi-Ming v The Queen
[1982] 1 AC 34 [sic] onwards, together with An-
derson v Morris [1966] QB 110 [sic].
Thus, the impetus for the re-examination of the soundness of the PAL
principle in Jogee and Ruddock came very much from the Court itself.42
House of Lords contained in Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234. See
alsoAustin vMayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010]UKSC 28, [2011]
1 AC 355, [24]-[25] (Lord Hope (with whom Lord Brown and Lord Kerr agreed.)).
40 Knowles QC (n 34) [x].
41 Jogee and Ruddock (n 32) [85] (LordHughes and LordToulson (withwhomLordNeuberger,
Lady Hale and Lord Thomas agreed)).
42 Knowles QC (n 34) 77.
10
Judicial Panel Selection in the UK Supreme Court: Bigger Bench, More Authority?
By contrast, the case of Keyu concerned a challenge to a decision by the
UK Foreign Secretary not to hold a public inquiry into the Batang Kali
Massacre in Selangor (modern-day Malaysia) by British armed forces in
1948.43 In this case, the Court was invited to replace the longstanding test
of unreasonableness as the basis of an action for judicial review as set out
in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation44 with
a new test of proportionality. While the legal merits of this question are
debated elsewhere in this volume,45 of note here is the view of the Court
(again sitting as a panel of 5) that:
It would not be appropriate for a five-Justice panel of this court
to accept, or indeed to reject, this argument, which potentially
has implications which are profound in constitutional terms
and very wide in applicable scope. Accordingly, if a propor-
tionality challenge to the refusal to hold an inquiry would suc-
ceed, then it would be necessary to have this appeal (or at any
rate this aspect of this appeal) reargued before a panel of nine
Justices.46
Such a ruling is surprising, not least because of the Court's ability to set
its own Panel sizes. More particularly, the Court had recently indicated
its support for precisely such a development in Pham v Secretary of State
for the Home Department,47 a case which was itself heard by a panel of
7 Justices. As Jake Rylatt and Joseph Tomlinson have pointed out in
an insightful post on the UK Constitutional Law Blog, `it is apparent
that nine Justices could have been allocated to Keyu, on the basis of its
profound constitutional implications, to paraphrase Lord Neuberger. It
is less apparent why this was not the case.'48 The depth of this quandary
may be further plumbed if one also contrasts the approach of the Court
in Keyu on this issue with the far less restrictive approach to overruling
longstanding and significant past judicial authorities taken by the Court in
Jogee and Ruddock, in which a similar panel of 5 Justices so strongly asserted
its own ability to change a fundamental aspect of the criminal law in both
43 Keyu (n 33) [8]-[14], [26] (Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Hughes agreed)). See Poole
and Shah (n 34) [x]-[y].
44 [1948] 1 KB 223.
45 See e.g. Poole and Shah (n 34).
46 Keyu (n 33) [132] (Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Hughes agreed)).
47 [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 WLR 1591.
48 Jake W Rylatt and Joseph Tomlinson, `Neuberger's Novelties: Keyu and the Substantive
Review Debate' (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 17 February 2016) <www.ukconstitution-
allaw.org/2016/02/17/jake-w-rylatt-and-joseph-tomlinson-neubergers-novelties-keyu-
and-the-substantive-review-debate/> accessed 20 November 2016.
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England andWales (via the UK Supreme Court side of the decision) and in
Jamaica (via the Privy Council side of the decision), with the concomitant
effect that such a historic ruling has on a number of States around the
world.49
In any event, while it is not uncommon for the Court to seek to rehear a case
before a larger panel if the case under review is considered more complex
than was originally thought after its initial hearings have been completed,50
a move which is not itself necessarily problematic, the implication that it
would be improper for the Court not to do so before making a significant
legal development is itself also surprising in so far as it appears to suggest
that a legal distinction exists between the value of decisions made by panels
of the Court of differing sizes. While it is clearly beyond the scope of
a mere introductory piece such as that contained herein to draw firm
conclusions on this issue, this undoubtedly marks a novel development in
the jurisprudence of the Court concerning the value of its own judgments.
As a consequence, it will be interesting to see how this idea is developed
in future cases and in particular, whether it is referred to by the Court in
its judgment handed down following the completion of oral argument in
Miller. Stay tuned, therefore, for Volume 8 of the Yearbook to see whether
any further statements from the Court or by leading commentators during
the 2016-17 legal year serve to illuminate this aspect of the decision (or,
indeed, any others).
4 Volume 7 of the Yearbook: Compilation and Constituent
Parts
As in previous years, the Yearbook is comprised of five constituent parts.
In addition to this Introduction, we have also continued our tradition of
featuring a Foreword to the volume as a whole, which precedes those five
parts. This year, we are delighted to feature an excellent Foreword by Chief
Justice Robert French of the High Court of Australia in which, amongst
other matters, the Chief Justice considers the cases in which his Court
has diverged from the approach of its British counterpart during the past
legal year, including in criminal joint enterprise, penalties and vicarious
liability.51
49 cf Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30. See Chief Justice Robert French, `Australia and the
United Kingdom: A Bit Like Family, Much in Common But a Lot of Difference' (2016) 7
The UK Supreme Court Yearbook [x], [y]-[z].
50 See e.g. International Energy Group v Zurich Insurance PLC [2015] UKSC 33, [2015] 2 WLR
1471; R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51, [2012] 1 AC 294.
51 Chief Justice French (n 49) [y]-[z].
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Part I of the Yearbook contains a collection of eight articles which analyse
a range of institutional and jurisprudential issues relating to the work
of the Court in the preceding legal year and, somewhat exceptionally
this year, a preview of the important case of Miller by Lord Millett in
which his Lordship considers what he believes is the `real question' in the
upcoming appeal to the Court.52 In addition to LordMillett, Part I contains
contributions from the President and Deputy President of the Court (Lord
Neuberger andLadyHale), five leading academics (ProfessorKateMalleson,
Professor Paula Giliker, Professor Sarah Worthington, Professor Thomas
Poole and Associate Professor Sangeeta Shah) and Julian B Knowles QC,
who led the successful appeal before the Court in the high-profile case of
Jogee and Ruddock as lead counsel for Mr Ruddock (on the Privy Council
side). Amongst the topics addressed in these pieces, readers will find
critical analyses of the judgments of the Court in cases such as Keyu,53
Jogee and Ruddock,54 Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV,55 Mohamud
v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc56 and Cox v Ministry of Justice,57 as well
as the thorny issues for the Court of judicial innovation, politics and
appointments.
Part II of the Yearbook contains a symposium of five articles concerning
the work of the Court in the field of human rights law, which are preceded
by another excellent Foreword, this time by Dominic Grieve QC MP. The
Protection ofHumanRights by theUKSupremeCourt symposium contains
contributions by a third, recently retired member of the Court (Lord
Toulson), two leading academics (Professor Brice Dickson and Professor
Helen Fenwick) and three leading barristers (Kirsty Brimelow QC, Richard
Hermer QC and Eleanor Mitchell). In addition to an excellent piece
by Professor Brice Dickson examining the views of individual Justices
on the protection of fundamental rights in general, the issues discussed
include the role of the Court in the sub-fields of common law rights,
counter-terrorism, legal accountability for military campaigns abroad and
ensuring the continuation of open justice in the courtroom despite the
challenges faced in protecting our national security.
Parts III and IV of the Yearbook contain a series of thematic analyses and
overviews of the cases decided by the Court in the 2015-16 legal year. Part
III includes a set of reflections on the jurisprudence of the Court in six
52 See Lord Millett (n 3).
53 Keyu (n 33); Poole and Shah (n 34).
54 Jogee and Ruddock (n 32); Knowles QC (n 34).
55 [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3WLR 1373; SarahWorthington, `The Death of Penalties in Two
Legal Cultures' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook [x].
56 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677; Paula Giliker, `Vicarious Liability in the UK Supreme Court' (2016)
7 The UK Supreme Court Yearbook [x].
57 [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660; Giliker (n 56).
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main areas, namely: Administrative Law and Judicial Review; Commercial
Law and Financial Regulation; Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure;
European Dimensions; Human Rights Law; and Private Law. Part IV
then provides a pithy overview to each and every case decided by the
Court during the 2015–16 legal year through the medium of 18 `overviews'
that analyse the contributions made by the Court in the relevant subject
areas. Many of these pieces are written by the same advocates who were
responsible for arguing those cases before the Court, making them the ideal
persons to provide a clear insight into the decisions reached by the Court
on each occasion and to elucidate the significant contributions made by the
Court in each field of law.
The Yearbook is finally completed in Part V by a selection of Appendices.
These contain detail concerning the composition of the Court, including
ad hoc Justices who sat on panels constituting the Court, a presentation
of key statistical information concerning the work of the Court, and an
index detailing the pages on which each case is cited so as to facilitate
ease of reference and use for our readers. We hope that this information,
which includes voting patterns within the Court, will appeal to those
interested in gaining further insights into the work of the UK's top court
and in comparing it to other judicial institutions both domestically and
internationally.
5 Acknowledgements
At roughly 530 pages in length, Volume 7 of the Yearbook is the largest
volume we have produced in the collection thus far. It includes contribu-
tions from over 50 authors, including three current Justices of the Court,
theChief Justice of theHighCourt ofAustralia, a retired LawLord, a former
Attorney General, seven Professors and Associate Professors and 40 promi-
nent barristers, 33 of whom are leading silks (QCs). As in any publication
of this kind, we are inevitably indebted to a great many people, without
whom this project would simply not have been possible. First and foremost
are Sarah Hack, who acts as our General Counsel for the overall produc-
tion of the Yearbook and Sidney Richards and Valentin Jeutner, who act
as our Chiefs of Information and Technology, respectively. We also wish
to acknowledge the efforts of our five Managing Editors, David Birch, Al-
ice Zheng, Matthew Eglezos, Emily Vale and Miriam Boxberg, who have
provided us with a significant level of assistance, goodwill and patience in
overseeing the copy-editing of the articles contained herein and with wise
advice on the development of the Yearbook as a whole. Our Editors for
Volume 7 are too numerous to list individually here (a full list can be found
in the front matter of this volume), but their work is likewise essential in
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ensuring that the Yearbook has been completed and for this we are most
grateful.
The table of contents for the Yearbook from year-to-year reads like a
veritable `Who's Who' of the legal profession, the contributions from
whom make for such enjoyable reading from cover-to-cover. This would
not be possible without the on-going support of so many dedicated and
talented people in the legal profession and beyond who lend us their
expertise which is essential to producing such a high quality Yearbook.
We owe a significant debt of gratitude to our very many authors for their
time, insightful contributions and their convivial correspondence, which
has made Volume 7 of the Yearbook a pleasure to publish.
This year, we also owe a special debt of gratitude to our illustrator, Isobel
Williams, who is an avid `Court-watcher' and can be seen, if one looks
carefully enough, seated discretely at the back of the courtroom with
a sketchpad and pencil quietly sketching her wonderful illustrations of
the Court's proceedings. (For those astute readers wondering about her
illustration at the front of Volume 7 of the Yearbook, the case illustrated is
Versloot Dredgin BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG58 – a case which
the illustrator's journal records as one involving `a stricken cargo vessel, a
bilge alarm and a roguemop head'59 – and the advocate in question with the
gold jacket lining is Colin EdelmanQC,who appeared for theRespondents.)
We are very pleased to be pleased to be publishing one of her excellent
illustrations in this volume and we look forward to publishing more of her
illustrations in the future.
We are additionally very grateful for the advice and on-going support from
the members of our Advisory Board, which includes Lord Neuberger, the
President of the Court (ex officio), Lady Hale, the Deputy President of the
Court (ex officio), Lord Millett, Professor the Lord Norton of Louth, Lord
Pannick QC, Advocate General Sharpston, Professor Sir David Edward,
Professor John Bell QC (Hon) and Professor Alan Paterson. As ever, we
likewise wish to express our sincere thanks to the hard working staff of
the Court itself. In particular, we have continued to work closely with Mr
BenWilson, the Director of Communications at the Court, who has again
provided considerable on-going support for the Yearbook and for which
we are most grateful. We have also been very pleased to welcomeMrMark
Ormerod as the new Chief Executive of the Court and the replacement for
58 [2016] UKSC 45, [2016] 3 WLR 543.
59 For other analyses of the case (ibid), see Crow QC, Hassell and Horner (n 8) [x]; Stephen
Smith QC and Tim Akkouh, `Civil Procedure and Fraud' (2016) 7 The UK Supreme Court
Yearbook [x], [x]-[x].
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Ms Jenny Rowe who has been most kind to us and has always given us her
very considerable support.
This year, Volume 7 of the Yearbook will be launched at an event in
the House of Commons on Monday, 12 December 2016, at which Julian
B Knowles QC will give our Annual Lecture for 2016 expanding upon
his excellent article on the future implications of the decisions in Jogee
and Ruddock, especially for those persons who are serving mandatory life
sentences for murder having been convicted on the basis of the (old) law
of parasitic accessorial liability following the Court's historic overturning
30 years of authority on criminal joint enterprise. We are very grateful to
Julian for his time in giving our Annual Lecture for 2016 and to Dominic
Grieve QC MP for hosting the event.
And finally in this section, we wish to thank our respective family
members for allowing us the time and space that is needed to complete the
considerable work required in undertaking such a large project. We are
most grateful for your help and support and we thank you for indulging us
as we have put together the publication contained herein.
It only remains for us to offer one final concluding vote of thanks.
To everyone who has contributed in any way with the production and
publication of this volume, thank you for all your help and assistance, we
wish you all well and we sincerely hope that you enjoy reading the pages
which follow in the seventh volume of the Yearbook.
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